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ABSTRACT
The research of Eurasian regionalism mostly focuses on the Eurasian
core, for example, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, which have been
pursuing a more exclusive and closer form of integration –
Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union. Other countries of the
post-Soviet space are often described as post-Soviet ‘escapists’ or
‘isolationists’ and mostly discounted in the analyses of the
Eurasian regionalism. The paper looks at six post-Soviet states,
who opted out from the Eurasian Economic Union, and analyse
their interaction with the EEU. The paper argues that despite
tensions in relations with Russia, most of these countries are
reluctant to entirely disrupt their economic relations with the
post-Soviet Eurasia. The paper argues that six countries of the
post-Soviet Eurasian periphery effectively pursue policies of a
looser form association with the Eurasian core. This ﬁnding allows
to argue that Eurasian regionalism, similarly to its European
model, consists of the core and outer circle. The outer circle is
featured by overlapping regional arrangements and growing
presence of external powers and growing number of transit and
trade ﬂows linking this Eurasian periphery with the West and Asia.
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Eurasian regional project and its periphery
The growing importance of the vast space stretching from Central Europe to the Paciﬁc
resulted in a new strand of literature focusing on Eurasia. The signiﬁer ‘Eurasia’ has orig-
inally been used to connote the entire post-Soviet space, linked to the issues of inter-
national security, inter-ethnic conﬂicts and geopolitics (Edwards, 2003; Smith Stegen &
Kusznir, 2015). But with the launch of the Eurasian Economic Union, its meaning was nar-
rowed down to one speciﬁc regional organisation and its three founding members. As a
result, most of works on Eurasia would either analyse institutional, legal aspects and econ-
omic of Eurasian Economic Union (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013; Libman & Vinokurov, 2012;
Vinokurov & Libman, 2012), or they would focus on the policies of and relations between
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (Jonson, 2004; Molchanov, 2015; Vieira, 2015). Finally,
specialists in European studies have analysed Eurasian regionalism from the point of
view of its interaction with the European Union (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012; Popescu,
2014; Van der Togt, 2015).
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Vsevolod Samokhvalov samokhvalovvsevolod@googlemail.com





























Empirically rich and insightful, these studies of Eurasia have one serious limitation. They
either fully ignore signiﬁcant part of the post-Soviet space, which is not part of the Eurasian
Economic Union, or they reduce it to a mere object of ﬁght of the struggle between the
external actors. One of the few exceptions to be nameD is a recent work by Dutkievicz and
Sakwa (2015). Even though a number of former post-Soviet states opted out from this
closer form of Eurasian integration, their role and policies should not be disregarded as
they constitute a signiﬁcant part of this geographic space. The focus on these countries
is necessary to explain what this part of the region is likely to look like.
This paper will focus on six countries in three subregions of the former Soviet territory –
Ukraine, Moldova in the West, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan in Central Asia. All these countries explicitly refused to join the deeper form
of post-Soviet regionalism, the Eurasian Economic Union. The ﬁrst group – Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine (GMU) – is often depicted as a group of states trying to escape
the Russian sphere of inﬂuence by seeking a closer association with the European
Union. The second group – Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – tends to be dis-
carded as mostly inward looking Oriental tyrannies in pursuit of isolationist foreign pol-
icies. However, these interpretations do not entirely grasp the complexity of these
countries’ economic choices. The attitudes of these countries to post-Soviet regionalism
vary and change over time. In the following sections, their differences and similarities
will be exposed to argue that these ‘Eurasian outliers’ effectively pursued policies of a
looser form association with Eurasian Economic Union, thus constituting a porous periph-
ery of the Eurasian core, zone with the growing presence of global players, namely Europe
and China.
Not escapers, but pragmatists – GMU (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine)
The geo-economic choice of this group of states is often depicted in zero-sum terms. Their
decision to pursue further trade relations with the European Union was often described
within them as political, and even a civilisational choice between Russia and Europe
(Fesenko, 2015, p. 135; White & Feklyunina, 2014). Even though pro-European rhetoric
was used by some of the governments of these countries, in reality their economic
choices, especially towards Russia, remained consistent and pragmatist throughout the
past 25 years. This commitment to pragmatism remained strong regardless of their ofﬁ-
cially proclaimed political choice either pro-European or pro-Russian. Despite signiﬁcant
ﬂuctuations in the rhetoric of the local governments, security concerns and sometimes
even dramatic deterioration of bilateral relations with Russia, these three states overall
tried not to disrupt economic interaction with Russia, and did not abolish existing trade
regimes.
This stability was the outcome of several counter-acting factors. On the one hand, the
strong wish of some pro-European forces to pursue closer relations with the EU was stalled
by Europe’s inability to integrate these countries. At that time, the EU was only prepared to
offer these countries quite a basic form of economic interaction: a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements (PCA) coupled with technical assistance (TACIS) and infrastruc-
ture projects (TRASECA). This lack of interest on the part of the EU drove the countries
of the region to remain on the two-track in their choices of economic integration. All





























States with its main geo-economic symbol, the CIS Free Trade Agreement, in 1994. Even
though the 1994 FTA Agreement contained a number of exemptions and did not function
in some cases, all three GMU countries signed a number of bilateral trade agreements and
agreed to use non-conﬂictual means of dispute arbitration in most situations.
Any further attempts, however, undertaken by ‘pro-Russian forces’ to deepen post-
Soviet integration were blocked by internal opposition. Often, dubious background of
such politicians allowed the opposition to mobilize signiﬁcant popular support. In the
case of Ukraine, some attempts of pro-Russian elites to proceed with deeper post-
Soviet integration (i.e. Single Economic Space, 1998/2003) were undermined by broader
popular protests against the authoritarian president L. Kuchma. In the case of Georgia,
even an allegedly corrupt and ‘pro-Russian’ President E. Shevardnadze made efforts to
integrate the country into the system of global economic governance by joining WTO
in 2000 and declined any offers to join deeper forms of post-Soviet integration, for
example, the Common Economic Space in 2003. At the same time, the Georgian leader
promised to look for cooperative forms of interaction with the CEP-4 and made efforts
to maintain good relations with Moscow (Korrespondent.net, 2003). Moldova followed
similar trajectory. Even the pro-Russian leadership led by Communist Party leader
V. Voronin, after a brief rapprochement with Russia, realised that this special relationship
with Moscow in fact prevented the country from receiving international aid and did not
resolve economic and security issues. Given these considerations, in 2003 even the Com-
munist Party of the Republic of Moldova effectively adhered to national common denomi-
nator: concurrent pursuit of Free Trade Area with Russia and European integration
(Shapovalova, 2012, pp. 60–61).
At the same time, Eurasian pragmatists tried to avoid zero-sum logic and manage their
economic interdependence by developing good bilateral relations with other countries of
the Eurasian core. Moldova maintained good bilateral relations with Belarus under both
pro-Russian President V. Voronin and the pro-European coalition. Relations did not
change even after the EU launched its Eastern Partnership programme. Regular high-
level meetings were held and many agreements were signed, of which 64 entered into
force (Froltsov, 2012, pp. 2–8). Similarly, Ukraine and Georgia maintained effective
relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Even though the initially pro-Western Georgian Pre-
sident M. Saakashvili pursued a messianic vision of democratisation of the post-Soviet
space, his relations with Belarus President A. Lukashenko, whom he had once called
‘last dictator of Europe’, eventually improved (EurasiaNet, 2007).
The tension between the Eurasian and European integration became stronger with
Russia actively promoting the Eurasian Economic Union. However, the response of local
elites – despite their ideological differences – was similar: a pragmatist balancing
between Russia and the EU. Allegedly ‘pro-Russian’ Georgian leader B. Ivanishvili had
strong personal animosities with the old ‘pro-Western’ President M. Saakashvili, but he
pursued similar economic policies. Often described as ‘Russia-backed oligarch’, the new
Georgian Prime Minister B. Ivanishvili pursued policies of deeper economic cooperation
with the EU whilst at the same trying not to antagonise Russia. Within this framework,
Georgia signed an Association Agreement which stipulated a Deep Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) with the EU (Ellena, 2015). Trying to reduce symbolic challenge
of this move to Russia, B. Ivanishvili spoke of Georgia potential accession to the Eurasian




























Union (RFE/RL, 2013) and discussed options of deepening relations with the Eurasian
Union, Russia and Belarus (Civil Georgia, 2015).
Identical policies were simultaneously pursued by ‘the most pro-Russian’ President of
Ukraine V. Yanukovych and the ‘most pro-European government’ of Moldova. Both gov-
ernments sought to deepen trade relations with the EU and prepared to sign an AA/
DCFTA. At the same time, V. Yanukovych made symmetric symbolic moves towards
Russia. For example, Ukraine joined the New Free Trade Area within the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CISFTA), created by eight CIS states on 18 October 2011. Similarly,
to Ukraine, the pro-European government of Moldova signed an AA/DCFTA with the EU
and at the same time acceded to the Free Trade Area of the CIS. The pro-European
coalition in Moldova also ratiﬁed the agreement in September 2012 (Ionesii, 2013). This
demonstrates that in case of the countries of shared Russian-European neighbourhood,
there was no correlation between ideology and geo-economic choices of the local
governments.
With the growing Russia’s pressure, President V. Yanukovych tried to avoid an escala-
tion of the conﬂict with Russia over Eurasian integration by depoliticising this issue. The
question was referred to the respected Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko, a cen-
trist politician and at the time Minister of Foreign Trade of Ukraine. Following the trade
wars between Russia and in Ukraine in early 2012, P. Poroshenko signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with the main decision-making body of the post-Soviet regional project,
the Eurasian Commission. The main purpose of the Memorandum was to create mechan-
isms which would allow the removal of tariff- and non-tariff barriers and avoid recourse to
judicial mechanisms (Real Economy, 2012).
That the quest for pragmatist consensus was not disturbed even by the annexation of
Crimea and the effective Russian–Ukrainian war in Donbass (Samokhvalov, 2015). Former
minister of foreign trade in Yanukovych’s government and centrist businessman Petro Por-
oshenko was elected president of Ukraine. Despite militant rhetoric from both capitals
over the past two years, P. Poroshenko effectively agreed to continue trilateral nego-
tiations to address Russia’s concerns about the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. Even though, at the
time of writing, the negotiations have been effectively stopped, it was formally the Euro-
pean Commission which made the move to halt the negotiations. The two sides were
reluctant to entirely cut off economic ties, apart from the military cooperation. The
trade of coal, electricity and other goods continued even though with some disruptions
in informal cross-border movements on the Ukrainian/Crimean demarcation line. The
fact that Poroshenko’s personal business in Russia remains intact and a number of
Russian businesses carry on their activities in Ukraine demonstrates that even strong mili-
tary stand-off has little effect on how the counties manage their economic dependence.
Russia increasing pressure on the countries of shared neighbourhood, however,
resulted in a new turn of geo-economic conﬁguration of the region. The three countries
sought to balance their dependence on trade with Russia by turning to China. Georgia
most actively sought to diversify its economic relations and by 2015 had achieved a
turning point in its geo-economic position when the Chinese economic presence in
Georgia outweighed that of Russia (Cecire, 2015). With the launch of the Chinese regional
infrastructure project for Eurasia – One Belt, One Road (OBOR) – Tbilisi did not miss the
opportunity to integrate the country into that global transport infrastructure by building





























the ﬁrst shipment that arrived from China to Tbilisi in December 2015, the new Silk Road
started its operation in East-West direction (Fokht, 2015). Trying to secure ﬂow of freights
Ukrainian government reduced the fees for transit good by the Ukrainian state railway
company from Odessa to the Western borders of the country (Ukrzaliznytsia, 2016).
Even though there are some serious doubts as to sustainability of this project, Georgia’s
turn demonstrates that the country is clearly looking for a third alternative to diversify
its choices (Inozemtsev, 2015).
Similarly, the pro-Russian Ukrainian President V. Yanukovich tried to reduce Ukraine’s
dependency on Russian energy and markets. In particular, he also sought to deepen
relations with China through three high-level visits. Ukraine agreed to lease China
160,000 hectares of arable land in the Crimea and started building a deep-water port in
the peninsula which would become part of the Chinese OBOR project (Izmirli, 2014; Lar-
ouchePac, 2013; Xinhua, 2011). His successor, ‘pro-Western’ President Poroshenko seeks
to further engage with China and deepen collaboration. The two leaders met in the frame-
work of the Davos World Economic Forum, and investments of 15 billion Yuan were
agreed. High-level commissions currently preparing top-level state visits (Gazeta-2000,
2015).
In addition, after the annexation of Crimea, Beijing tried to transfer the old Crimea con-
tracts to Russia which now controlled the peninsula, but failed to reach an agreement
(Worldcrunch, 2015). As a result, Chinese companies transferred their economic and infra-
structure projects from Crimea to mainland Ukraine (Liga News, 2015). Despite all the per-
sonal conﬂicts between the current ‘pro-Russian’ Georgian leadership and the radical ‘anti-
Russian’ President Mikheil Saakashvili, who currently governs the Odessa region of
Ukraine, interacted in successful delivery of the ﬁrst container from the Ukrainian port Ili-
chevsk (near Odessa) to Kazakhstan, thus launching Great Silk Road transit in West-East
direction (Xinhua, 2016). Similarly to Ukraine, Moldova also sought to intensify its relations
with China both under its ‘pro-Russian’ President Voronin and under the pro-European
coalition (Moldova.Org, 2015). Chisinau also achieved inclusion of the country in the
OBOR project. In April 2015, China Shipping Group, tasked to implement the OBOR Strat-
egy of the Chinese government, launched container shipping services through Giurgiulesti
– Moldova’s only port on the Danube. This contract effectively linked the Great Silk Road to
the European waterway infrastructure (Lakshmi, 2015).
The above suggests that regardless of their political preferences and ideologies, a non-
ideological pragmatist consensus emerges among the elites of the shared Russian-Euro-
pean Neighbourhood. The growing presence of the European Union is obvious and
might have been considered as detrimental to Russia’s interests in the region. However,
a signiﬁcant role in this process was played by Russia, which applied security and econ-
omic leverage on these countries and pushed them to look for alternative options in
their foreign economic policies. The presence of China becomes an even more important
factor which will change the regional conﬁguration from a bilateral Russian-European
stand-off to a more complex and trilateral great power interaction. Since Chinese
project has less of symbolic change for Russia and any conﬂictual strategy towards
China is too risky, one can expect that Moscow will eventually choose to diffuse the ten-
sions along the new transit route.




























Isolationists or non-aligners – ATU (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
Geopolitical environment of Central Asia is different from East European periphery.
There is far less of cultural afﬁnity between these nations with Russia and far lesser
interests of the EU to the region. All these created necessary cognitive landscape for
a ‘civilized divorce’ of these counties from Russia. Russia tended to consider this part
of the post-Soviet space as an underdeveloped periphery and as a source of various
security challenges. Within this logic, Russia’s foreign policy was driven by consider-
ation of containment and damage control rather than a prize as it was the case with
the shared Russia-EU Neighbourhood (Dmitirieva, 2014). As a result of this perception
of the region, mutually beneﬁcial security assurances became a shallow common
denominator for bilateral relations between these countries and Russia.
Drawing on this consensus, the second group – the energy-rich countries of the Cau-
casus and Central Asia – Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – pursued neutral
and multivector foreign policies. Two of these countries, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,
made their commitment to explicit neutrality policy or even a legal act. The concept of
‘Finlandization’ of Azerbaijan was used explicitly on various occasions (Valiev, 2010). Simi-
larly, Turkmen foreign policy pursued a policy of positive neutrality by the UNSC Resol-
ution. Uzbekistan pursued a similar ideology of self-reliance which was pervasive and
penetrated all spheres of Uzbek life. However, the research of the region has shown
that foreign policy labels can be imbued with different meanings and dictate various
policy options. While in the dimension of foreign policy this trend has been acknowledged
(Contessi, 2015), similar policy options may be traced in the foreign economic dimension
of these countries.
Given the lack of mutual interest, these countries of Eurasian periphery pursued minim-
alist in the interaction with the Eurasian economic integration. They sought to maintain an
optimal trade regime with Russia and CIS member-states, but unlike GMU-group they
explicitly avoided any strong symbolic commitment to multilateral cooperation within
the CIS. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan refused to join the Free Trade Zone Agreement in
2011, whereas Uzbekistan reluctantly joined two years later. At the same time, all three
counties declined the invitations to establish special relations with the Eurasian Economic
Union, but also remained at the level of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the
European Union. Turkmenistan under President S. Niazov demonstrated such a poor
human rights record that EU Member States refused to ratify the generic EU-Turkmenistan
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. For the past 20 years, the two sides had to use an
Interim EU-Turkmen Trade Agreement as framework for their relations.
Within this framework, Azerbaijan developed its cooperation with the EU mostly in the
spheres of transport and energy transit. In particular, Baku actively worked on the EU-
funded TRACECA and INOGATE transport programmes. In 1997, Azerbaijan tabled propo-
sal for a revitalisation of the Great Silk Road. But, at the same time, it maintained close
cooperation with Russia in the energy ﬁeld (Iftiyev, 2010). However, Azerbaijan made it
clear that any participation in deeper forms of post-Soviet integration would be unaccep-
table. Notably, the offer to join and, respectively polite refusal to participate in the Eurasian
Economic Union was expressed by Azeri President I. Aliyev during his meeting with Kazakh
President N. Nazarbayev (Izzet, 2014). At the same time, ‘taking into account the potential





























agreed only to a limited cooperation’ [with the EU]. Instead of an Association Agreement
and Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area, the EU and Azerbaijan signed only an agree-
ment on visa facilitation at the Vilnius Summit of Eastern Partnership (Ibrahimov, 2013,
p. 117). But even without Association, Agreement with the EU Azerbaijan was able to
gradually increase its trade with the EU to 47.3 per cent of total foreign trade. Trade
exchanges with Indonesia, Russia, Turkey and the USA follow with about a 6 per cent
share each (European Commission, 2015a).
The crisis in Ukraine, falling energy prices and US rapprochement with Iran and the
arrival of shale oil lost these countries wealth, which had immediate repercussions on
the politics and foreign economic activity of Azerbaijan (Broers, 2015). President I. Aliev
introduced a series of measures aimed at liberalising business activities and foreign
trade, namely imports (Haqqin, 2015). Moreover, arrests among the top security ofﬁcers
accused of interference with business activities seemed to send a strong signal to the tra-
ditional Azerbaijan elites about the changing policies (RFE/RL, 2015). Russia’s pressure on
Azerbaijan to join the EEU raised serious security concerns and pushed Azerbiajan to seek
economic alternatives. In this situation, the launch of the Chinese OBOR project became an
important event echoing Azerbaijan’s long-standing vision about the ancient Great Silk
Road and infrastructure development. The economic perspectives of Azerbaijan were
explicitly linked to closer ties with the Great Silk Road Belt (Donnan, 2015). Signiﬁcant
investment was made to upgrade capacities of the port of Baku on the Caspian Sea. Inau-
gurated personally by the Azeri President, the port became an important link between the
Central Asian and the Caucasian parts of the Great Silk Road (Gasimli, 2015).
At the same time, Azerbaijan leaders openly stated their commitment to pursue closer
relations with the European Union. The EU effectively removed its value-based agenda
from bilateral discussions and focused on its strategic interests. In exchange, Baku
expressed its commitment to support Southern Gas Corridor, which would further
reduce EU dependence on Russia’s energy supply. To mitigate potential risks of Russia’s
response to what it might see as Europe’s infringement on its sphere of inﬂuence Baku
increased the level of its military cooperation with Russia, a symbolically important
move for Moscow (PISM, 2015). Arms trade and join military exercise have increased in
2015 demonstrating that Russia can always count on Azerbaijan’s positive neutrality in
the domain of international security and foreign policy. At the same time, there being
not many policy-makers, Baku expect that this statement of friendliness will be recipro-
cated by Moscow.
Similarly, Turkmenistan, after its negative experience of energy cooperation with Russia,
showed strong interest in deepening its interaction with China and later with Europe.
Efforts to diversify Turkmen gas exports began in 2007–2008 with the construction of
the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. Ever since Russia’s imports of Turkmen gas gradually
decreased from 40 bcm (2008) to 8–10 bcm (2009–2014) per year, China had been gradu-
ally overtaking Russia as the main consumer of Turkmen gas (Gurt, 2015). This slow change
was formalised with the visit of the Chinese President to Central Asia in 2013 during which
Turkmenistan and China signed a Joint Declaration on Establishing the Strategic Partner-
ship. The two leaders attended the opening ceremony of the world’s second largest Galk-
ynysh Gas Field, which highlighted the growing Chinese primacy in Turkmen gas exports.
A number of high-level visits followed and 12 agreements on diplomacy, economy,
energy, ﬁnance, education, culture and sub-national cooperation were signed (Ministry




























of Foreign Affairs of Chinese People’s Republic, 2015). Currently, China and Turkey out-
weigh the Eurasian Economic Union as the destination of Turkmen exports at 74.1 per
cent. In their share of Turkmen imports, Turkey, China, UAE and the USA are gradually over-
taking the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union with 51 per cent versus 13.4 per cent
(CIA Factbook, 2015). This data suggest that even though formally Turkmenistan pursued a
policy of neutrality and isolationism, the country was gradually entering the international
system of exchanges of Asian economy.
In relations with Europe, the new Turkmen President G. Berdimuhamedow promised to
make some concessions in the ﬁeld of human rights, which resulted in the EU govern-
ments promising to ratify the EU−Turkmen partnership and cooperation agreement
(Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce, 2014). Soon after that the Turkmen President met
the EU Commissioner for Energy S. Šefčovič on 1 May 2015. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Turkmeni-
stan and the EU Energy Commissioner signed that day the Ashgabat Declaration expres-
sing their intention to link the Turkmen-Azeri Trans-Caspian pipeline to the EU-sponsored
Southern Gas Corridor, which would enable delivery of Turkmen gas to the EU (European
Commission, 2015b). The ﬁrst meeting of the Ashgabat Declaration Enlarged Working
Group (EU, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan) at the level of deputy energy ministers
took place in Brussels on 14 July 2015. Pursuing further diversiﬁcation of energy exports,
Turkmenistan completed a new ‘East-West’ pipeline due to become part of the Trans-
Caspian-Southern Corridor link to Europe (Turkmenistan Zolotoi Vek, 2015). In addition,
it has started construction of the TAPI pipelines going southwards (Turkmenistan–Afgha-
nistan–Pakistan–India), a project supported by Western institutions (Hasanov, 2015). Fur-
thermore, Turkmenistan actively promotes development of transport networks through
the UN and other multilateral fora. In 2016 it will host the ﬁrst world conference on inter-
national transport infrastructure (CaToday.Org, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkme-
nistan, 2014). The Turkish airline Pegasus was one of the few low-cost airlines which were
allowed to launch ﬂights to Ashgabat (Trend, 2015a). All this demonstrates that despite
their formal policy of neutrality, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan were prepared to depart
from the post-Soviet regional integration and get involved into the global system of econ-
omic exchanges through their Asian partners.
In case of Uzbekistan, the main motive behind its a drive to redirect its economic ties
beyond the post-Soviet partner was the growing ideology of self-reliance (mustaqilik).
Started as cultural renaissance and de-Russiﬁcation, this doctrine resulted in situations
when Uzbekistan was prepared to break its economic and production ties with Russia
regardless of the risks of deindustrialisation (Teles Fazendeiro, 2015). For example, Uzbeki-
stan did not hesitate to sacriﬁce deeper collaboration with Russia in aerospace industries
and engage in short-term partnership with Washington even if this resulted in halting its
own hi-tech industry. The primary Tashkent attitude to post-Soviet integration was to stay
in as long as the commitment remained non-binding and shallow. Within this approach,
Tashkent participated in a loose form of post-Soviet Eurasian Economic Community
and, after careful considerations, joined the multilateral agreement on Free Trade Area
with the CIS. But it was always wary of deepening integration. After signing the agreement,
Uzbekistan made sure that it would not be obliged to apply national treatment to the
imports from the CIS (Gadimova, 2014). Eventually, Uzbekistan did not apply any trade bar-
riers (Garkun, 2015, p. 50), but vigorously refused to participate in deeper formats of inte-





























wariness about the EU unilateral launch of the Eastern Partnership policy towards the
countries of shared neighbourhood, Uzbekistan was not against Eurasian integration
per se, but opposed the way it was presented as a far accompli or ‘take it or leave
package’ (Interview with Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2015).
Similar to other countries, Uzbekistan sought to balance its dependence on Russia by
developing bilateral relations with China, Turkey and South Korea. Top-level ofﬁcial
visits took place every year since 2004 when China allocated more than USD 1 billion in
grants to the Uzbek government (Molchanov, 2015, p. 115). Ofﬁcial meetings of the
Uzbek and Chinese Presidents in 2011, 2012 and 2014 resulted in the signing of a Declara-
tion on Strategic Partnership, an agreement on extending gas pipelines from Uzbekistan
to China and 31 more documents between Uzbekistan and China (National Information
Agency of Uzbekistan, 2013). Within this logic, Uzbekistan expressed its ﬁrm intention
to fully participate in and even to lead involvement of Central Asia into the Chinese
Great Silk Road. The project was discussed at several meetings of an Inter-Governmental
Committee launched as a part of the Chinese–Uzbek Strategic Partnership. It was also the
theme of the 3rd China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum held in June 2015 in Shandong
Province (Xinhua, 2015a). During the forum, several logistic centres were opened jointly
by Chinese and Central Asia representatives. The meeting of the Chinese–Uzbek Inter-Gov-
ernmental Committee was also held within the framework of the Forum. The two sides
signed memoranda to strengthen cooperation in trade, investment, ﬁnance and com-
munications within the Silk Road Economic Belt framework (Xinhua, 2015b, 2015c).
Three pipelines were built to deliver Uzbek gas to various parts of China (Yaqing, 2015).
The presence of Chinese companies in Uzbekistan grew substantially over the past two
years. Trade turnover rose from $904 m (2007) to $4.7bn (2014) (Trend, 2015b). The infra-
structure projects implemented by both parties aim to give China access to South-Asia
(National Information Agency of Uzbekistan, 2013). In addition, Uzbekistan seeks to
involve other Asian powers in further internationalisation of their trade options. As a
result, China and Turkey are gradually overtaking the Eurasian Economic Union as the
main destination of Uzbek exports, at 39.9 per cent versus 29.1 per cent. An increasing
role of other Asian partners conﬁrms this trend (CIA Factbook, 2015). Similarly, the share
of Uzbek imports from China, South Korea, Turkey, Germany and the USA noticeably
exceeds the share of Russian and Kazakh imports (50.4 per cent versus 35.1 per cent).
The fact that Tashkent and Ashgabat warmly welcomed South Korea’s growing presence
in infrastructure projects in the region demonstrates these countries’ strategy to diversify
their trade and transport orientation to a broader Eurasian space, in Eastern as well as
Southern directions (Fumagalli, 2016).
Overall the countries of the ATU group pursued a more active, even though less visible,
strategy of departure from the post-Soviet economic complex. While pursuing this strat-
egy, local elites could rely on rich resource base to centralise their power and to gradually
reduce their dependence on economic ties with Russia. Ideological commitment to inde-
pendence or self-sufﬁciency were helpful to deal with the hardship of disintegrating econ-
omic ties and deindustrialisation. Reduction of the dependency on Russia was
accompanied by closer economic ties with Asian players. The limitations of this model
became obvious with fall of oil prices. However, Russia’s growing ambitions for a
deeper Eurasian integration led to politicisation of the project and further escapist
policy choices pursued by these countries. This effectively resulted in further opening of




























these countries to European and – through Chinese OBOR project – Asian economic
complex.
Conclusions
The case of former Soviet countries which opted out of any closer forms of post-Soviet
integration shows signiﬁcant changes taking place in the Eurasian space. Despite some
rhetorical differences (pro-European or pro-Russian), the leaders of Georgia, Moldova
and Ukraine refused to join the Eurasian Union and pursued pragmatist policies of balan-
cing between the post-Soviet and European integration. The ideal arrangement for these
countries was a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the European Union and free
trade regime with the Commonwealth of Independent States. Even trade wars and the
most dramatic Ukrainian crisis did not change this pragmatist approach. These countries’
parallel participation in the CIS Free Trade Zone overlapping with Deep Comprehensive
Free Trade Area with the EU turns them in some sort of an outer circle of Eurasian core-
grey zone with overlapping arrangement and equally dense web of economic exchanges
between Eurasia and Europe. However, the Ukrainian crisis pushed these countries to
further look for other markets and production chains, even if at the expense of their
high-tech collaboration with Russia. This led to deepening of their relations with the EU
on the one hand. On the other hand, the growing presence of China allows these countries
to secure alternative trade options with other Asian partners. Growing trade with the other
countries of Eurasian core – Belarus and Kazakhstan – leads to further erosion of economic
boundaries between Eurasian core and its periphery. Special relations and power asymme-
try between Russia and China will prevent serious conﬂict between the two countries.
However, further incorporation of these countries into China-European system of
exchanges will result in further erosion of the Eurasian Economic Union as a single geo-
economic entity.
The second group of states – Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – has been pur-
suing policies which led to their gradual distancing from the Eurasian core and to a deeper
involvement in the global economy through trade with the Asian powers. Strong ideol-
ogies of exceptionalism and self-sufﬁciency were helpful to overcome this dependence
even though sometimes it meant loss of high-tech industries. Sometimes, Russian
foreign policy expedited this departure. The fact that Moscow treated these post-Soviet
areas as underdeveloped periphery prevented serious geopolitical competition in the
region. Being a source of illegal migration, Islamism threat and drug trafﬁcking for
Russia, Central Asia was not perceived as a prize to compete for. Within this thinking,
Moscow did not see the EU as a potential competitor in the region and did not employ
conﬂictual policies throughout the 1990s. This indifference had two consequences.
Firstly, the countries developed deeper economic ties with Asian powers. Secondly,
there was trust and proper history of relations which would be conducive to bringing
these countries into Russia-led regional projects.
Uzbekistan decided not to join the Eurasian Economic Union because it saw the project
as unilateral initiative adopted by Russia and promoted by Kazakhstan. Negative experi-
ence of the Russian–Turkmen energy trade prevented any meaningful dialogue in this
domain. The crisis in Ukraine reassured Azerbaijan that security promises by Russia





























as long-term regional integration project. Russia’s growing hegemony in promoting Eur-
asian integration led to politicisation of the project and further escapist choices pursued
by these countries. The case of Azerbaijan, as well as other causes under study, demon-
strates that Russia’s policy of trading security in exchange for closer economic integration
has reached its limits. In fact, Moscow’s attempt to push this policy further became
counter-productive. The crisis in Ukraine followed by the falling oil prices revealed the
limitations of the oil-based development strategies and pushed these countries to liberal-
ise and open their economies to Asian and European powers.
The above processes suggest that the Eurasian continent is being reshaped. Firstly,
growing trade with Europe and China gradually ‘dissolves’ the purely post-Soviet
element of the region. Secondly, from an entity mostly centred around Russia’s vast terri-
tory, the former Soviet space gains new momentum and centres of gravity. The alternative
energy infrastructure reshapes this vast geographic space into East-West direction. The
growing presence of China in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova suggest that the element
of Asia has become more pronounced in the Eurasian geo-economic complex. Further-
more, the Chinese OBOR project creates new transport infrastructure redirecting transit
routes from Northern Eurasia southwards to Central Asia, Caucasus, Turkey and then to
Southern and Eastern Europe. Also, new southward transit routes from Central Asia to
South Asia and Gulf states also add new geographic spin to this region. This new region-
alism challenges the frequent assumption that genuine regionalism is possible only
between countries with a similar ideology. In the Eurasian peripheral project, countries
of pro-democratic polities (GMU) have close interaction with soft and tough authoritarian
(ATU) and communist system (China).
Despite all formal declaration about Russian–Chinese cooperation, there is obvious
tension between the core of Eurasian regional project and its periphery. In fact, if the
China-driven integration momentum is maintained and spread further, then Eurasian per-
iphery will turn into a central axis of a new megaregional entity of the size of continent
stretching from China to Europe. The future of this new continentalism will, however,
still depend on the relations between Russia and China. If their relations develop within
the same cooperative paradigm, the two projects will coexist and concurrent process of
growing dissolution of the post-Soviet Eurasian core in broader China–Europe system of
exchanges. If Russian–Chinese relations deteriorate, then it is likely that Russia will
employ conﬂictual policies towards the countries of Eurasian periphery to increase the
costs of their rapprochement with China. This will then result in destabilisation and
series of crises in these countries with potential spill-over effects in broader Central
Asian, Caucasus and shared neighbourhood.
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